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Abstract
The paper uses dynamic programming to investigate when contestants should bank
their current winnings in the TV quiz show , the Weakest Link. It obtains the optimal
strategy for the team as a whole and then looks at two possible reasons why the
contestants tend to use other strategies in reality.
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The “Weakest Link” has proved to be a successful television game show in a number
of countries. In each round the team of contestants are asked questions in turn and the
amount the team can win goes up as the chain of correctly answered questions
increases. If a question is answered incorrectly, then all the money built up in the
chain is lost. Each contestant can decide to “bank” the money before hearing their
next question and then the chain starts from 0 again. There is an upper limit on the
amount that can be won in each round and the length of time of the round, (as well as
the number of contestants) goes down from round to round.   The decision of which
team member is voted off at each round – “the weakest link”- gives the game its name
but there is little science, some psychology and lots of prejudice in that decision. The
decision of when to bank though can be treated rationally though the contestants
rarely seem to make such rational decisions.
In the next section the problem of when to bank is formulated as a dynamic
programming problem and the optimal strategy identified. The formulation works for
all the versions of the game but we give the results for the UK tea-time version of the
game where the chain’s value goes  £0, £20, £50, £100, £200, £300, £450, £600, £800
and £1000.  We then examine the myopic strategy of deciding whether or not to bank
by considering what maximises the value after one more question. This could be
considered the strategy that is individually rational. Finally we examine what happens
if a contestant is arrogant (or modest) and believes they are more (or less) likely to
answer a question correctly than the other contestants.4
OPTIMAL STRATEGY
Suppose the maximum you can earn in each round is M and the value of banking after
a chain of i correct answers is ci where 0=co < c1 < c2 < c3 < c4 < c5 < c6 < c7 < c8 <c9
=M. Assume that there are N questions available in the current round. The rounds are
of a given time, and the length of time to ask and answer a question are closely
distributed around 7.5 secs. Hence it is reasonable to assume that there are a known
number of questions in each round.  To solve the problem one needs to estimate p, the
probability of the team answering each question . We assume this is the same for each
question asked and that the team members have a good estimate for it when making
their decisions about banking.
Thus at any point in a round, the state of the game is given by ( n, i, b) where n is the
number of questions still to be asked in that round, i is the number of questions
correctly answered so far in the current chain and b is the amount banked in the
round. The objective is to maximise the expected amount banked by the end of the
round. Let that be V(n,i,b) if the current state is (n,i,b). Then V( n,i, b) satisfies the
following optimality equation
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where V(0,i,b) = min(M, b+ci  )   for 0≤  ci ≤  M
The first term is the result of banking now so that b+ci is in the bank ( provided it does
not exceed M)  and then the next question is correctly answered with probability p or
incorrectly answered with probability 1-p. The second term is what happens if the
there is no banking at this stage. With probability p the run increases to i+1 correctly5
answered questions while with probability 1-p the next answer is wrong and the chain
reverts to 0 correctly answered questions.
Once can solve this equation using a spreadsheet and the results for the UK example
are as follows
Example: UK where co =0, c1=20, c2=50, c3=100, c4=200, c5=300, c6=450, c7=600,
c8=800, c9 =M=1000. N= 25 for (180 sec rounds) down to 15 for (110sec round)
The expected payoffs in the cases N=15,20 and 25 are given below as p varies.
Figure 1: expected reward each round as function of p
The optimal strategy obviously varies depending on the probability, p, of getting the
questions correct. If p=0.6 ( and any lower value of p), the optimal strategy is to bank
at £20 in a chain ( i.e. after each correctly answered question) no matter how much is
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already banked or how many more questions to go. If p= 0.7, then one should always
bank when the chain reaches £200 if there is £520 or less in the bank already. Figure 2
shows what happens thereafter. The dotted line is the boundary between banking at
£200 and banking at £100 in the chain; the dashed line is the boundary between
banking at £100 and £50 and the complete line is the boundary between banking at
£50 and £20 in the chain. One starts banking at £100 if there is £530 in the bank and
there are 25 questions to go. The amount needed in the bank before one banks at £100
increases as the number of questions left decreases. Thus one first banks at £100 with
one question left if there is £840 or more in the bank already. As the amount already
in the bank increases one will at some point bank when the chain reaches  only £50.
This occurs when there is £590 already in the bank if there are  25 questions to go but
goes up to £910 when there is only 1 question to go. If the amount in the bank
increases even more then one will eventually bank with only £20 in a chain,. The
lower limits for this is £620 in the bank already if there are 25 questions to go and
£960 if there is only 1 question to go.
Figure 2: Optimal strategy
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This structure of banking earlier in the chain the more one has in the bank  also occurs
when p=0.8 but in this case the point at which one stops the chain varies from £800 to
£20. One banks at £800 if one has £0 already in the bank and only 3 questions left
while if one only has 1 question left one would bank at £800 if the current amount is
£230 or less. With 25 questions to go, the following strategy is optimal. One would
bank at £300 if one had £60 or less in the bank already; one would bank at £200 if one
already had  between £70 and £500 in the bank ; one would bank at £100 if between
£510 and £580 in the bank; one would bank at £50 if one had between £590 and £630
and thereafter one would  bank at £20.
One might expect the banking strategy to have some obvious monotone properties .
Formally if the game is at stage (n,i,b, ) ( n questions to go i correct answers in the
chain so far and b in the bank) one might expect that if one banks at ( n,i,b) one might
also want to bank at (n, i+1, b), so one gets more conservative the longer the chain.
One might also think one banking at (n,i,b) means one wants to bank at  (n+1,i,b) in
that having an extra question to go should not make you want to take more risks. One
might also expect that  if one banks at ( n,i,b) one would also want to bank at (n,i,b+a)
so the more one has in the bank already the more conservatively one should play . In
fact the first two conjectures are incorrect as the following two counter examples
show
Example 1: Not conservative in i
With p=.6, then at  state (1, 2,500) one banks and so expects to get 562, (i.e. 550 +
0.6(20) +0.4(0)) , rather than 560, ( i.e.500 +0.6 (100)). At (1,3,500) one does not8
bank since one expects 620 ( i.e.500 + 0.6(200) ),  rather than the 612 (i.e. 600
+0.6(20) ) if one banks).
Example 2: Not conservative in n.
Again with p=0.6 as described above one should bank at ( 1, 2,500). At ( 2, 2,500)
though one should not bank and the expected reward is 576.8  ( 500 + .36(200)+
.24(20) +.4(0)) as opposed to 574 ( 550 + .6(20) +.6(20)) if one banks.
SELFISHNESS AND THE MYOPIC POLICY
 An alternative way of deciding when to bank is to work out whether or not to bank at
this question assuming that the team would bank at the next question. This is not an
optimal policy but usually does very well. It is termed a myopic policy because it is
optimal in the shortsighted way of trying to maximise the reward over the next
question. It is also the policy that a selfish contestant might use if they argue as
follows. What is important is not to be picked out by the other contestants as the
weakest link. Thus one does not want to lose the team large amounts. Hence the
objective should be to maximise the expected gain to the team from the next question.
So in both cases the analysis goes as follows.
If i questions have been correctly answered so far and p is the belief that one can
answer the question correctly, then not banking now wil give an expected reward at
the end of the question of pci+1 +(1-p)0, while banking now will give ci +pc1 +(1-p)0.
Thus one should bank if one believes ci +pc1 > pci+1  or
p <   ci /(ci+1-c1 )( 2 )
Consider what this suggests in the following three examples9
Example: UK early evening.
In this c1=20, c2=50, c3=100, c4=200, c5=300, c6=450, c7=600, c8=800, c9 =M=1000.
Thus one should bank at £20 if one believes p<0.66. The other limits are bank at £50
if p<0.625, bank at £100 if p< 0.55; bank at £200 if p<0.714; bank at £300 if p<0.697;
bank at £450 if p<0.775; bank at £600 if p<0.769 and bank at £800 if p<0.816. So in
fact one should only bank at £20 ( if one believes p<0.66), at £200 (if one believes
0.66<p<0.714), at £450 ( if one believes 0.714<p<0.775) or £800 ( if one believes
0,775<p<0,816). This is very different behaviour from that displayed by most of the
contestants who tend to bank at £50 and £100.
Example: UK late evening.
In this case c1=100, c2=250, c3=500, c4=2000, c5=2500, c6=2250, c7=3000, c8=4000,
c9 =M=5000. Since all these levels are five times the early evening equivalent, the
results are exactly the same and contestant should only bank at £100, £1000, £2250 or
£4000 depending on their beliefs about getting a question correct.
Example US
In this case c1=$1000, c2=$2500, c3=$5000, c4=$10000, c5=$25000, c6=$50000,
c7=$75000, c8 =M=$125000.
In this case one should only bank at $1000 ( if one believes p<0.66) or $50000 ( if one
believes 0.666<p<0.6756). Otherwise one goes all the way to $125000.
The question arises of how good is this strategy? One can calculate the value under
this strategy  by using equation 1 but where we use the banking policy specified rather
than the banking decision that gives the maximum value ( i.e. if in the UK example if10
we believe p=0.7 then we bank at £200  and do no bank before). The difference
between the expected reward under the optimal policy and this myopic policy is
shown in Figure 2 for the case of 15, 20 and 25 question rounds and all the various
choices of probability p. For low p, the myopic policy of banking at £20 is also the
optimal policy and there is no difference in expected total rewards. The major
differences occur when the myopic policy changes from one banking level, so for
example at p=0.816 it suggests banking at £800 while at p=0.817 it suggests banking
at £1000.
ARROGANCE
It is clear to any addict of the show that the contestants rarely follow the above
banking strategies. There may be many reasons for this, including that they have little
idea of what percentage of questions are being correctly answered, but one other
reason springs to mind. A contestant might believe they have a different probability of
Fig 3: Difference between optimal and myopic policies 
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answering questions correctly than the other team members. This arrogance (or
modesty) might lead them to a different banking strategy.
Given that the state of the game is ( n, i, b) and one believes the team answers each
question correctly with probability p, what is the probability of answering the next
question correctly that makes one decide not to bank. We call this the arrogance
probability a(n,i,b,p), and it is the probability value which  means it is equally valid to
bank or not bank. If one believes one’s chance of getting the question correct is less
than this value one should bank and if one believes it is more than this value then one
should not bank. Assuming V(n,i,b,p) is the solution to equation(1) with probability p
used, then a(n,i,b,p) satisfies
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For p=0.7 and n=15, Table 1 gives the values of a(15,i,b,0.7) as i and b vary, (na
means it is not appropriate to have a value in this case as the total one can get in the
round already exceeds M).12
Current
value of run
(ci) Amount already banked (b)
0 150 300 450 600 750 900
20 0.515 0.515 0.519 0.547 0.568 0.689 0.992
50 0.532 0.532 0.536 0.567 0.604 0.852 1.000
100 0.578 0.578 0.580 0.602 0.626 0.988 na
200 0.733 0.737 0.753 0.783 0.954 1.000 na
300 0.712 0.725 0.762 0.888 1.000 na na
450 0.798 0.829 0.927 1.000 na na na
600 0.831 0.946 1.000 na na na na
800 0.991 1.000 na na na na na
Table 1: value of a( 15, i, b, 0.7)
The table shows that if the current run is only at £20 then someone using this strategy
is willing to risk trying the question even if they feel they only have a slightly over
50% chance of getting it correct. On the other hand if the current run is worth £450
they will only risk going for the question if they are 80% or more sure of getting it
correct. Essentially they can be modest and go for the question without banking even
if they believe their chance of getting it right is below the other contestant’s average
of 0.7 if there is £100 or less in the current run. If there is more than this available in
the current run, they should be arrogant and only risk not banking if they believe they
are much more likely to get it right than the others. This form of the result holds for
almost all the choices of n and p that are likely to arise.
CONCLUSIONS
Dynamic programming analysis shows that the optimal banking strategy is quite
different from that displayed by the contestants. Whether this difference is due to
contestants’ selfishness, arrogance or inability to assess the chances of answering
questions correctly is open to debate.13
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